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Part II

Some critics have asserted that the military would try to avoid carrying out orders it doesn't like, but recent history demonstrates this to be unfounded. "Time and again in the past decade [the 1990s]," Writes Colonel Richard D. H o o k e r, U.S. Army, "military policy preferences on troop deployments, the proliferation of nontraditional missions, the drawdown, gender issues, budgeting for modernization, base closure and realignment, and a host of other important issues were overruled or watered down" (2003, p. 7). On virtually every issue, military leaders made their case with candor and conviction before accepting the decisions made by their civilian leaders. Once the policies had been set, the military worked hard to implement and carry them out. Could society legitimately expect anything else?

As to the question of public discussion by military officers, the current secretary of defense, Robert Gates, recently expressed his preference that military advisers speak "candidly but privately" (Stewart, 2009, p. 1). There have, of course, been times when military leaders have crossed the line and behaved both unprofessionally as well as illegitimately regarding proper subordination to civilian authority; one such example is the MacArthur-Truman controversy of the Korean War. H o o k e r agrees that the "increasingly common tactic whereby anonymous senior military officials criticize their civilian counterparts and superiors, even to the point of revealing privileged and even classified information, cannot be justified" (2003, p. 9).

While the military does have some advantages in policy debates, the real issue behind the concerns about the strength of civilian control is what H o o k e r calls "political freedom of action" (2003, p. 9). Large staffs, extended tenure, and bureaucratic expertise, do strengthen the hand of military leaders on the big issues of budget, force structure, and social policy, as well as war and peace, but without congressional or media support, the influence of military leaders is actually rather limited. The dilemma a civilian leader faces, thanks to the separated powers mandated by the Constitution, is that they cannot always get their way without paying a political price. A civilian leader who ignores sound military advice runs the risk of losing his job. Consider the example of defense secretary Les Aspin who ignored a request for tank support in Somalia in 1993, and was forced to resign after the costly battle featured in the book and movie Black Hawk Down.

Another issue that Snider raises is the idea that military officers have grown less politically neutral and more partisan in the last thirty-five years (2000, p. 40). Officers are more likely than the American public to identify (64%) with one political party, however, the reasons for the possible shift in affiliation are open to speculation. For example, seven of the last ten presidential administrations have belonged to one party, and such ascendency could have influenced many an individual's political affiliation, be they civilian or military. Additionally, one party is (rightly or wrongly) seen as generally more supportive of such issues as military pay, quality of life, and a strong defense. Finally, since the late 1970s, the percentage of young Americans identifying themselves with a certain party has risen significantly across the board - at least, until recently (H o o k e r, 2003, p. 6).

Whatever the political affiliation of military officers, they do not appear to align with the extremes of either major party. H o o k e r points out that they "overwhelmingly shun the 'far-right' or 'extremely conservative' labels, are far less supportive of fundamentalist religious views, and are significantly more liberal than mainstream society as a whole on social issues" (2003, p. 6). H o o k e r believes that military officers are more likely to be found in the political center than in the far right. Additionally, the military is not any more politically active than the voting public at large, and most Americans are not partisans in the sense of being actively involved in party politics. Military officers do not proselytize, organize politically, vote in large numbers, or make campaign contributions on a large scale (H o o k e r, 2003, p.6)

H o o k e r also notes a common criticism of retired officers who publicly campaign for specific candidates (2003, p. 60). Yet this trend can be observed in favor of both parties and documented evidence suggests that the practical effect of these endorsements is minimal. "Except in wartime," writes H o o k e r, "most voters cannot even identify the nation's military leaders. They are unlikely to be swayed by their endorsements." It has been a long time (1952) since active-duty military officers have contended for the presidency, which would be a far more serious breach of civilian control.

The attitudes and actions of academia can also affect civil-military relations. Morten G. Ender and Ariel A. Gibson have examined the discussion of the military topics in introductory sociology textbooks. There have been 43 studies addressing textbooks published between 1986 and 2000. "Although war and peace are of topical concern . . . there is disparate treatment," writes Ender and Gibson. "Likewise, there is a paucity of peace and war coverage in general sociology journals and peace in primary school U.S. history textbooks" (2005, p. 250).

The study of military history has had an embattled past on American college and university campuses. John A. Lynn writes that "Military history has never been a popular specialty among academics; on the contrary, it has always been something of a pariah in U.S. universities. We used to be condemned because we were believed to be politically right-wing, morally corrupt, or just plain dumb" (1997, p. 777). But military historians have gone from bad to worse, argues Lynn, "and the flow of historical fashion is very much against us and promises to remain so for the foreseeable future."

Naturally, the negative status of military history and, by extension, the military itself, among academia is a contributing factor to the civil-military gap. Some examples of authors who have demonstrated a lack of understanding of military history, or who have perpetuated military history myths in scholarly journals, strengthens the perception that the military is unworthy of the society it protects. Theo Farrell writes about a U.S. military bias toward "techno-centric" warfare: "This is most evident in America's air war against Japan, which resulted in the deaths of some 400,000-900,000 Japanese civilians" (2005, p. 6). Farrell quotes Michael Sherry who writes that "leaders and technicians of the American air force were driven by technological fanaticism - a pursuit of destructive ends expressed, sanctioned and disguised by the organization and application of technological means." Farrell also points to what he calls the "carpet bombing" of North Vietnam.

The leaders of the U.S. Army Air Forces during World War II were indeed driven to employ technology in the pursuit of military victory, but their preference was for what they called "daylight precision bombing." Though the technology of the day was limited, the Army Air Force suffered great losses in an effort to hit military targets with accuracy rather than area bomb at night as the British Royal Air Force chose to do. Bombing from high altitude, the Army Air Force found its efforts at daylight precision bombing of Japan thwarted by the previously unknown jet stream. It was only then that the controversial decision was made to bomb Japan with incendiary weapons at low altitude at night. The firebombing of Japan was actually a low technology effort.

The use of "carpet bombing" in relation to the bombing of North Vietnam is also problematic. "Carpet bombing" properly refers to the bombing of a large rectangular area of the German front lines during the Normandy campaign of World War II. Applied to the Vietnam War, it likely refers to bombing missions by B-52s in which a large bomb load was dropped on a small area. But before 1972, the only part of North Vietnam that B-52s bombed were the areas just north of the demilitarized zone that were unpopulated by civilians.

To bomb military targets near the population centers of North Vietnam, the U.S. Air Force sent single-seat fighter-bombers to conduct dive bombing attacks. Dive bombing is a method of turning ordinary bombs into precision weapons by diving low on the target before release. American fighter-bomber crews went out of their way, at great risk to themselves, to hit the military targets they were sent to attack. Additionally, efforts began during the Vietnam War to develop what are today called precision guided munitions, with the purpose of destroying military targets with fewer bombs and reducing civilian casualties as much as humanly possible.

The doctrine of the U.S. Air Force compliments that of the U.S. Army. As a reaction to the casualties of World War I, the Army chose tactics during World War II that could be described as "sending a bullet instead of a man." When encountering significant opposition from enemy forces, the Army infantry would stop and call in support from tanks, artillery and air power. This doctrine continues to be preferred by the Army today, but the U.S. Marine Corps tends to look down on the practice of stopping and calling in supporting fires. Tension between the Army and Marine Corps erupted on a handful of occasions during the Pacific War when slow Army tactics lengthened campaigns which, in the view of the Marines, led to more casualties.

Some scholars and military historians point to a casualty-averse mindset in both military and civilian leaders. Yet studies have shown that the American people are willing to accept a high number of casualties, at least as long as they believe in the mission (Snider, 2000, p. 40). Regarding the war in Iraq, the public may have developed an aversion to the number of casualties because it came to oppose the mission, or because it was unprepared for a difficult and costly occupation. Military leaders tend to be more casualty averse than civilians, and one possible reason is that they may equate casualties with failure (Snider, p. 40).

Finally, there are those in the American society that view that military as a "macho" culture, something that at least some view with disdain. The text uses the example of the Bolivian military and its method of developing "a heightened sense of masculinity in its soldiers" (Miller, 2007, p. 302). As far as the U.S. armed forces are concerned, Regina F. Titunik argues that the "macho" military is a myth (2008, p. 137). Titunik quotes Madeline Morris as saying that the qualities of the military culture "include dominance, assertiveness, aggressiveness, independence, self-sufficiency, and willingness to take risks" (2008, p. 140). But Titunik counters that "the qualities required for organized warfare rewarded as 'manly' are not aggression or bloodlust, but, paradoxically, are qualities that both opponents and proponents of an imagined hyper-masculine military associate with femininity: teamwork, submission, obedience, and self-sacrifice."

With its emphasis on cooperation, comradeship, and of rewarding merit, the military actually produces conditions that could be favorable to women. "While an image of the manly warrior plays an ideological role in the military, with real consequences," writes Titunik, "this image coexists in complex ways with the requirements of organized warfare that prevail against the masculinist ideal" (2008, p. 140). The military, as it turns out, is a complex environment featuring traditions and tendencies that can be seen as contradictory. Even fighter pilots, often viewed as the most "macho" of military members, rely on teamwork, submission and self-sacrifice to accomplish their missions.

As we have seen, there are cultural tensions between the American civilian society and the U.S. military. The public has definite expectations of the armed forces, such as competence, sound advice, political neutrality and social responsibility, things which the military may not always live up to. But some of the tensions are based on misperceptions of how military leaders should behave, and the worry of a military takeover is unfounded. Through this look at the civil-military gap we have learned that the armed forces are absolutely committed to civilian control; that military leaders do have a key role in the process of making policy, but that some civilian leaders may view the military as disloyal because they cannot always force it do what they want without paying a political price; that academia is sometimes lax or hostile in its treatment of military subjects; and that there are misperceptions about military doctrine and history such as a techno-centric bias and masculine qualities, but that the military would rather send a bullet instead of a man while trying to hit military targets with precision and that feminine qualities such as teamwork and self-sacrifice are integral to organized warfare.