Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who led Strategic Air Command from 1948 to1957,
considered America’s first ICBM, the Atlas, an extravagant boondoggle
that wouldn’t perform as anticipated. It would achieve a "satisfactory
state of reliability [only after] long and bitter experience in the
field," he argued. Of course, LeMay consistently put ballistic missiles
last among SAC funding priorities, meaning the Atlas wouldn’t get a
chance to gain the "long and bitter experience in the field" that he
demanded. Furthermore, LeMay disparaged ICBMs as mere "political
and psychological weapons," insisting any money budgeted for them would
be better spent on "penetration aids"—air-to-surface missiles—for his
bombers.
Gen. Thomas D. White, who became vice chief in June 1953, and later
Chief of Staff from 1957 to 1961, vehemently disagreed. In May 1954,
over LeMay’s heated objection, White raised the ICBM to the top of
USAF’s research and development priority list. Over the next seven
years -- the remainder of White’s time on Active Duty -- he and LeMay clashed
over the direction of the Air Force. White prevailed, outmaneuvering
LeMay to shepherd the Atlas into the inventory.
Link:
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/January%202013/0113LeMay.aspx
